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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the relationship between corruption and infrastructure at both 
the country and regional level using the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys data. A 
statistically significant and considerable relationship is established between the 
measure of corruption in the macro data and the measures of transportation and 
electricity infrastructure. Countries with more corruption tend to have worse 
infrastructure.  At the regional level, the key result is unchanged. The magnitude and 
significance of this result is shown to vary by global region. Two stage least squares 
results, using distance from the equator as an instrument at the macro level support 
the simple OLS. Finally, it is shown that within country variation in corruption has a 
significant effect on regional infrastructure. 
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1 Introduction 
When asked to name some of the key problems facing developing countries, many 
people, experts and layman alike, will answer corruption and infrastructure. The 
importance of these factors is borne out by those on the ground. For example, nearly 
84% of firms in Niger feel that corruption is a major constraint to their operations 
according to the World Bank’s Enterprise Surveys (ES).1 It is important to note that 
this is not just a Sub-Saharan African problem. On average, the problem is worst in 
the Middle East and North Africa region (57%) though even in the high-income 
OECD sample the data show that some firms consider corruption to be a hindrance 
(14%). Dissatisfaction with infrastructure is also widespread. In terms of 
transportation (electricity) infrastructure, 50% (63%) of respondents in Niger 
identified it as an obstacle. These problems are worst in Sub-Saharan Africa (27% and 
49%) but again are still an issue in the high-income OECD sample (11% and 16%). 
The phenomena of corruption and unsatisfactory infrastructure thus seem to be a 
particular problem in developing and transition countries but are still to be found in 
richer economies.  
 
Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) was an early exposition of the link between corruption and 
infrastructural quality. Amongst other findings, they show that corruption is 
associated with a lower quality of infrastructure across a range of indicators. Del 
Monte and Papagni (2001) find that corruption has a negative effect on the efficiency 
(in terms of economic growth) of expenditures on public investment in a sample of 
Italian regions. Bose, Capasso and Murshid (2008) present a model in which 
corruption is only detrimental to infrastructural quality once it passes a threshold and 
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supports this argument with empirical evidence. Using an early version of the ES data 
in conjunction with other data, Kenny (2009) finds a correlation between measures of 
corruption and some measures of infrastructural quality, though as Kenny himself 
emphasises, the sample size available to him is very small. The first contribution of 
this paper is to revisit this question with a new dataset that arguably contains more 
satisfactory measures of both variables. Corruption emerges as a significant correlate 
of infrastructural quality in line with many existing papers in this literature. 
 
These papers for the most part do not address issues of endogeneity, though many of 
them are not attempts to establish a causal relationship. Endogeneity is a concern in 
two regards when investigating the link between corruption and infrastructure. Firstly, 
the possibility of common and unobservable causes for both the level of corruption 
and quality of infrastructure cannot be discounted. Secondly, it is conceivable that 
countries or regions with worse infrastructure will tend to have more corruption. The 
second contribution made here is to address this endogeneity. Corruption is shown to 
be an important factor in determining infrastructure. 
 
The final and most important contribution of this paper is to extend the analysis to the 
regional level. The link between regional, or local, infrastructure and regional 
corruption has not yet been studied widely and the ES data allows one to do so. Two 
important results emerge from this exercise. Firstly, a higher level of corruption in a 
region is associated with poorer infrastructure. Secondly, the variation from the 
national average in corruption is associated with both a lower level of infrastructure 
both in general and in relation to the national average. 
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These results have important policy implications. If, as is evidenced by the data, more 
corrupt countries have infrastructure that is not acceptable in the eyes of business, 
then any policy that sees infrastructure as the path to development needs to recognise 
this. In terms of regional development, the results suggest that regional development 
and infrastructural policies need to take account of both the local degree of corruption 
and of the within country variation. Corruption has been shown to have negative 
relationships with important factors such as growth (e.g. Mauro (1995)), foreign direct 
investment (e.g. Wei (2000)), inequality and poverty (e.g. Gupta, Davoodi and 
Alonso-Terme (2002)), individual well-being (e.g. Gillanders (2011)), environmental 
policy (e.g. Fredriksson and Svensson (2003)), inflation (e.g. Al-Marhubi (2000)), 
attitudes to the political system (e.g. Anderson and Tverdova (2003)) and the quality 
of regulation (e.g. Breen and Gillanders (2012)). The potential importance of 
infrastructure for growth has been examined by theorists such as Agènor (2010) while 
Esfahani and Ramırez (2003) present a structural model and conclude that 
infrastructure is a considerable boon in terms of GDP. Wang (2003) finds that 
electricity matters for child mortality and Fernald (1999) finds that transport 
infrastructure is good for the productivity of firms in vehicle intensive industries. 
Thus, there is a large body of evidence that both corruption and infrastructure are 
important factors in an economy. The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. 
Section 2 describes the data, sections 3 and 4 present the country level and regional 
level results respectively, and the final section concludes. 
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2 Data 
The main source of data on the variables of interest for this paper is the World Bank’s 
Enterprise Surveys (ES) database. These representative firm level surveys collect 
information on a wide range of topics and have been widely used in empirical work. 
The ES team provide country level averages of the key variables and I generate the 
regional level indicators from the raw firm level data.2 Unfortunately, the data is not 
suitable for panel data analysis as the surveys have been conducted only once in some 
countries and in different years. The ES infrastructure and corruption variables used 
here come from survey questions that ask firms to state how much of an obstacle 
various factors are to their operation. Respondents can answer on a scale from zero 
(no obstacle) to four (very severe obstacle) on each factor. These measures have some 
important advantages over other commonly used variables. 
 
Firstly, as opposed to the often used Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) compiled by 
Transparency International (TI), the ES corruption measure is not based on the 
perceptions of experts. It is a measure of perceptions but the perceptions of those 
directly affected by and who have experienced corruption. Another popular measure 
of corruption is the World Bank’s Control of Corruption (CC) measure produced by 
Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2010). As CC is highly correlated with the World 
Bank’s Rule of Law (RL) measure of institutional quality and other such variables, it 
is difficult for one to separate and identify the effects of corruption and general 
institutional quality when they are included simultaneously.3 Both of these alternative 
measures of corruption will be used in checks of the robustness of the main result. 
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These variables cannot be used when we turn to examine regional level results as they 
are only computed at the national level.  
The infrastructure variables used here measure how much firms perceive each type of 
infrastructure to be an obstacle whereas the infrastructure variables used by Tanzi and 
Davoodi (1997), Bose, Capasso and Murshid (2008) and others are intended as 
measures of the quality of infrastructure. It is well known that these quality measures 
are far from perfect. For example, Bose et al. point out that taking the length of paved 
roads as a measure of transportation infrastructure ignores the issue of width and 
measures based on the proportion of roads that are paved lead to large countries being 
penalised [Bose, Capasso and Murshid (2008); pp1178]. Like the ES corruption 
variable, the infrastructure measures I shall use here are based on how much of an 
obstacle firms find the type of infrastructure. Holding countries with different levels 
of development and different types of economy and production to the same external 
standards of infrastructure, even if they are perfectly objective, would be an inferior 
choice in the context of the current question. The specific infrastructure questions 
used relate to transportation infrastructure and electricity infrastructure at the country 
level, and to these two plus telecommunications infrastructure at the regional level.  
 
The variables of interest are the percentage of firms in a country or region who 
responded that the factor in question was a major or very severe obstacle to their 
operations. Figures 1 and 2 plot the macro relationships between infrastructure and 
corruption using the pooled data. Both figures show a relationship between the two 
with it being particularly strong in the case of transportation infrastructure. The data 
on distance from the equator were obtained from Parker (1997). All other variables 
were obtained from the World Development Indicators (WDI) and the TI and ES 
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datasets. Table A1 provides summary statistics and additional information for all of 
the variables used. 
Figure 1: Country Level Transport Infrastructure and Corruption 
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Figure 2: Country Level Electricity Infrastructure and Corruption 
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3 Country Level Results 
The general form of the model used in estimating the relationship between corruption 
and infrastructure quality is of the form: 
INFit = α + β1CORit + β2GDPPCit + β3INSTit + β4AREAit + εit  (1) 
where INFit  is either the ES country level measure of transport or of electricity 
infrastructure, CORit a measure of corruption, GDPPCit is the natural logarithm of 
GDP per capita, AREAit is the natural logarithm of land area in square kilometres, and 
εit is an error term of the standard type. 
 
The model is estimated using pooled OLS due to the fact that, as mentioned in Section 
2 above, the ES data does not (as of yet) form a panel of sufficient dimension. As 
unobserved heterogeneity is always a concern, it will be important to check that the 
main results are robust to the inclusion of country specific dummy variables. The 
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additional controls are included to capture the potential deep determinants of a 
country’s infrastructure. The first is GDP per capita as a control for the level of 
economic development and prosperity. This data comes from the WDI. The second is 
institutional quality as measured by the World Bank’s Rule of Law variable. I include 
this variable as there is a long standing literature that has explored the relationship 
between institutional quality and aspects of infrastructural quality. Henisz (2002) 
provides an overview of this literature. Finally, land area is controlled for as it seems 
sensible to allow for countries of different sizes to have different levels of 
infrastructure, regardless of other considerations.  
 
 
Table 1 presents results obtained from running this model on the ES measures of 
transport (Panel A) and electricity (Panel B) infrastructure. The first column of each 
panel establishes that there is a statistically significant relationship between the ES 
measure of corruption and both of the infrastructure variables. Further, the R2 
statistics indicate that a large proportion of the variance in infrastructural quality 
across countries can be accounted for by corruption alone. These large R2 statistics are 
not present in columns 2 and 3 where alternative measures of corruption are used, 
though corruption remains highly significant (though the signs differ from Column 1 
as these variables give bigger numbers to countries with less corruption). This 
association remains in the face of country fixed effects, as can be seen in Column 4. 
 
More importantly, the magnitude of the association is economically meaningful. The 
results of the first column indicate that a one standard deviation - approximately 20% 
- increase in the corruption variable is associated with an increase of roughly 7% and 
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10% in the transportation and electricity infrastructure variables respectively. In both 
cases this is about 0.4 of a standard deviation. This is about half of the difference 
between the Europe and Central Asia sample and the Africa sample in terms of 
transport infrastructure and one third of the difference between the two in terms of 
electricity infrastructure. 
 
The final column includes the other potential determinants of infrastructural quality 
outlined above. GDP per capita is significantly correlated with both measures with 
richer countries tending to have better infrastructure as one would expect. Firms in 
countries with better institutions tend to be less satisfied with infrastructure, though 
this relationship is only significant in Panel A. This is perhaps contrary to what one  
Table 1: Country Level Results I: Baseline Results 
 Panel A: Transport Infrastructure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Constant 4.857*** 23.539*** 16.220*** 11.835* 27.429*** 
 (1.219) (2.343) (0.850) (6.714) (7.193) 
      
Enterprise Surveys Corruption 
Measure 
0.370***   0.337*** 0.385*** 
 (0.038)   (0.125) (0.042) 
      
Corruption Perceptions Index  -1.867***    
  (0.598)    
      
Control of Corruption Index   -2.824**   
   (1.149)   
      
Natural Log of GDP Per Capita     -2.585*** 
     (0.806) 
      
Rule of Law Index     3.308** 
     (1.406) 
      
Natural Log of Land Area in 
Square 
    -0.269 
Kilometres     (0.340) 
      
Country Fixed Effects NO NO NO YES NO 
R2 0.32 0.04 0.02 0.82 0.35 
N 224 205 220 224 216 
      
 Panel B: Electricity Infrastructure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Constant 13.646*** 45.872*** 28.356*** 35.608*** 77.707*** 
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 (2.950) (4.299) (1.578) (11.177) (16.366) 
      
Enterprise Surveys Corruption 
Measure 
0.508***   0.571*** 0.501*** 
 (0.069)   (0.209) (0.074) 
      
Corruption Perceptions Index  -4.562***    
  (1.107)    
      
Control of Corruption Index   -6.277***   
   (2.155)   
      
Natural Log of GDP Per Capita     -6.121*** 
     (1.709) 
      
Rule of Law Index     3.189 
     (2.626) 
      
Natural Log of Land Area in 
Square 
    -1.525* 
Kilometres     (0.792) 
      
Country Fixed Effects NO NO NO YES NO 
R2 0.19 0.07 0.04 0.85 0.26 
N 224 205 220 224 216 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and ***   indicate significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
would expect a priori. One explanation is that in countries with good institutions, 
there is a higher expectation of, say, good roads and that this effect is greater than any 
tendency for good institutions to provide better infrastructure. Another plausible 
explanation is that the institutional quality is endogenous in much the same way that 
corruption may be. Finally, there is no strong evidence that the size of a country plays 
a role.  
 
Having established that there is a relationship in general, it is good practice to see if 
this relationship varies by geographical region. For example, Asiedu (2002) and 
Blonigen and Wang (2005) have demonstrated this to be a worthwhile exercise in the 
FDI literature. This is particularly important if one wishes to offer even broad policy 
advice to developing countries. Different global regions may have different needs 
with regards to infrastructure and different ways of providing it. The size of the 
relationship in different settings may also be of interest. Table 2 divides the sample 
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into four general regions - Africa (including North Africa), Europe and Central Asia 
(ECA), Latin America and Caribbean (LAC), and the Rest of the World (RoW). 
 
Panel A shows that in most groups the relationship between corruption and transport 
infrastructure is significant and sizeable. Only in Column 8 is the corruption variable 
insignificant. This is the RoW sample with the additional controls. It should be borne 
in mind that the RoW sample is a rather small and heterogeneous sample. Thus the 
RoW results should be treated with extra caution. The coefficient is largest in Africa 
and it is also worth noting that the size of the country plays a significant role in this 
sample with larger countries tending to have better transport infrastructure in the eyes 
of firms. The story seems to be very different when it comes to electricity  
Table 2: Country Level Results II: Sample Splits 
Panel A: Transport Infrastructure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Africa 
Europe & Central 
Asia 
Americas & 
Caribbean 
Rest of the World 
 
Constant 11.717*** 43.563*** 1.843 -13.976 14.078*** 15.282 10.025*** 34.346 
 (2.341) (15.799) (1.573) (13.648) (3.038) (16.114) (3.402) (25.323) 
         
Enterprise Surveys 
Corruption Measure 
0.391*** 0.404*** 0.307*** 0.345*** 0.172** 0.312** 0.242** 0.070 
 (0.062) (0.070) (0.075) -0.074 (0.064) (0.128) (0.114) (0.096) 
         
Natural Log of GDP 
Per Capita 
 -2.071  0.885  -0.289  -0.345 
  (1.999)  (1.712)  (1.833)  (3.020) 
         
Rule of Law Index  -2.258  1.072  4.033  0.103 
  (3.609)  (2.574)  (2.911)  (3.056) 
         
Natural Log of Land 
Area in Square 
 -1.651**  0.699  -0.345  -1.578** 
Kilometres  (0.811)  (0.634)  (0.616)  (0.690) 
         
R2 0.40 0.50 0.25 0.29 0.10 0.15 0.19 0.20 
N 54 51 96 96 47 46 27 23 
         
Panel B: Electricity Infrastructure 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 
Africa 
Europe & Central 
Asia 
Americas & 
Caribbean 
Rest of the World 
 
 13 
Constant 41.802*** 118.258*** -0.426 -18.541 37.647*** 44.301 11.613* 72.096 
 (7.382) (24.304) (1.573) (20.164) (7.130) (31.911) (6.633) (51.468) 
         
Enterprise Surveys 
Corruption Measure 
0.153 0.118 0.664*** 0.691*** -0.017 0.147 0.706*** 0.598** 
 (0.143) (0.169) (0.136) (0.131) (0.135) (0.226) (0.156) (0.209) 
         
Natural Log of GDP 
Per Capita 
 -4.589  4.151  -0.510  -7.336 
  (3.401)  (2.827)  (3.552)  (4.967) 
         
Rule of Law Index  -7.969  -4.674  3.305  -8.280 
  (7.717)  (4.108)  (4.956)  (6.354) 
         
Natural Log of Land 
Area in Square 
 -4.068**  -1.299  -0.794  -0.749 
Kilometres  (1.738)  (1.056)  (0.970)  (2.145) 
         
R2 0.02 0.19 0.34 0.36 0.00 0.04 0.37 0.44 
N 54 51 96 96 47 46 27 23 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and ***   indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. 
infrastructure, as can be seen in Panel B. In this case corruption only has a significant 
association with infrastructure in the ECA sample. Once again, country size is 
inversely related to firms’ perceptions of infrastructure in Africa though not in either 
the ECA or LAC samples. A general point that emerges from these tables is that there 
is a relationship between corruption and infrastructure but that the efficacy of any 
policy based on this relationship will be dependent on where the policy is to be 
carried out and on the type of infrastructure. 
 
Of course, to be able to offer credible policy advice one must provide at least a certain 
degree of evidence that the relationship is free of endogeneity bias. As outlined above, 
there are convincing arguments that the prevalence of corruption and the degree of 
infrastructural quality are endogenous. Distance from the equator (DE) is used as an 
instrumental variable in an attempt to obtain estimates which are clean of this 
endogeneity. DE has been used as an instrument for general institutional quality in a 
range of papers such as Hall and Jones (1999) and Rodrik, Subramanian and Trebbi 
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(2004). Treisman (2007) captures the intuition behind using DE as an instrument for 
corruption well (when arguing that DE would not make a good instrument for looking 
at the effect of economic development on corruption): “If settler mortality led 
European colonists to create more exploitative, unaccountable governments in 
countries with more tropical climates, closeness to the Equator might slow economic 
development by encouraging corruption” (p226).4 Put at its most simple, the argument 
can be represented as: tropical climate → more exploitative colonial government → 
more corrupt post-colonial government. 
 
 
 
 
Table 3: Country Level Results III: IV Results 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Type of Infrastructure: Transport Electricity 
Constant -17.363*** 23.360* -32.741*** 70.149*** 
 (5.474) (13.168) (11.223) (27.011) 
     
Enterprise Surveys Corruption 
Measure 
1.030*** 1.128*** 1.886*** 1.881*** 
 (0.169) (0.205) (0.364) (0.391) 
     
Natural Log of GDP Per Capita  -4.381***  -9.457*** 
  (1.523)  (3.323) 
     
Rule of Law Index  12.916***  21.035*** 
  (3.599)  (7.104) 
     
Natural Log of Land Area in 
Square Kilometres 
 -0.644  -2.223* 
  (0.597)  (1.290) 
     
First Stage F Statistics 28.76 21.51 28.76 21.51 
N 224 216 224 216 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and ***   indicate significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. The instrument used for the corruption variable is 
distance from the equator. 
 
The results of this 2SLS exercise are presented in Table 3. For both of the 
infrastructure variables, corruption is a statistically significant factor. All 
specifications have first stage F statistics that are satisfactory by the standard of the 
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Staiger and Stock (1997) rule of thumb. The IV strategy will be invalid if the above 
relationship is not strong enough or if DE is a determinant of infrastructural quality 
outside of the instrument’s effect on corruption. The former can be tested for using 
the standard weak instrument rule of thumb while the later could be looked at using 
tests of over-identifying restrictions if there were more instruments.5 
 
4 Regional Level Results 
The previous section established that the data points to a strong relationship between 
the level of corruption in a country and its infrastructure and provided some evidence 
of an effect running from corruption to infrastructure. The ES data provide a unique 
opportunity to take the analysis to the regional level. Corruption is more often than 
not spoken of as if there were no within country variation, perhaps because the most 
widely used measures exist only at the country level. This is also somewhat true of 
discussions of infrastructure in this literature. However, there are strong reasons to 
think that such variation may be large. Certain regions may be more corrupt for 
cultural, historical or general economic reasons while infrastructure may vary by 
region for similar reasons, in addition to geographical considerations and perhaps due 
to variation in corruption. Figures 3 and 4 show that such variation exists in the data. 
The upper and lower points on the bars show the maximum and minimum regional 
values for each country while the points show the country average (where the data are 
pooled over time). It is worth noting that this variation does not seem to correlate with 
the level i.e. the length of the bars does not tend to increase or decrease in any 
obvious (linear) way as we move along the horizontal axes.  
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It must be noted that these regions are not always necessarily real administrative or 
geographical divisions. For example, Argentina is divided into Buenos Aires, Chaco, 
Cordoba, Mendoza and Rosario while Armenia by contrast is divided into North, 
South East, South West and Yerevan. Therefore one must bear in mind that the data 
may be somewhat noisy in general and particularly so in some countries. I drop those 
countries that have only one region. These are mostly very small countries such as 
Burundi and Fiji. Each observation is obtained by averaging the firm level data for 
each region (in each year where applicable). 
 
In addition to the two infrastructure variables available in the macro data, the firm 
level dataset contains a question that asks how much of an obstacle  
Figure 3: Within Country Variation in Corruption 
 
Figure 4: Within Country Variation in Transport Infrastructure 
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Table 4: Region Level Results I: Baseline Results 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
 
Transport Electricity Telecommunications 
 Constant 0.167*** 0.176** 0.021 0.307*** 0.573*** 0.650*** 0.091*** 0.174*** 0.086 
 
(0.017) (0.076) (0.124) (0.025) (0.109) (0.182) (0.016) (0.057) (0.166) 
          Enterprise Surveys 
Corruption 0.170*** 0.182** 0.180*** 0.300*** 0.171** 0.339*** 0.354*** 0.287*** 0.341*** 
Measure (0.043) (0.086) (0.042) (0.054) (0.082) (0.056) (0.046) (0.063) (0.045) 
          Natural Log of 
Average Total Cost of 
Labour 
  
-0.002 
  
-0.041*** 
  
0.022*** 
   
(0.006) 
  
(0.008) 
  
(0.006) 
          Average % of Sales 
That Are National 
  
0.002* 
  
0.002 
  
-0.003** 
   
(0.001) 
  
(0.002) 
  
(0.001) 
          Country Fixed Effects NO YES NO NO YES NO NO YES NO 
R2 0.05 0.51 0.08 0.08 0.73 0.18 0.18 0.53 0.25 
N 438 438 437 438 438 437 402 402 402 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and ***   indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. 
 
telecommunications is to the firm’s current operations. Telecommunication 
infrastructure is obviously an important element in the modern world. The ES 
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measure has an advantage over the often used number of telephone mainlines variable  
in that, as Wallsten (2001) points out, people can have more than one line and some 
lines may be used by multiple people (p6). 
 
There is no regional GDP variable in the dataset so, as a (somewhat crude) proxy, I 
use the average total cost of labour to control for income. In addition, I control for the 
percentage of sales that are national. It seems plausible that regions which produce 
more for the domestic market than the foreign market could require different types of 
infrastructure and to different degrees. 
 
Table 4 presents the results from estimating OLS regressions using this regional data. 
In the case of each of the infrastructure variables, corruption is a sizeable and 
significant correlate. Corruption can only explain a small proportion of the variation 
in infrastructure on its own as can be seen from the R2 statistics in columns 1, 4 and 
7. Given the wide range of plausible determinants of regional infrastructure this is not 
surprising. The inclusion of country fixed effects does not cause the corruption 
variable to lose its significance nor does the inclusion of the additional controls. These 
controls are interesting in their own right. Regions with a higher average total cost of 
labour tend to have better reported electricity infrastructure and worse 
telecommunications infrastructure on average. Regions that produce more for the 
domestic market tend to have firms that are more satisfied with the state of 
telecommunications infrastructure. 
 
Table 5 splits the sample in the same way as was done above. Once again, the 
motivation for this is that it is reasonable to expect that the relationship under study 
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will vary across the globe. Briefly, we can see that this is indeed the case. In Africa, 
for example, there is no significant relationship between corruption and electricity 
infrastructure (Panel B) but there is with the other infrastructure measures. The 
magnitude of the relationship also varies by global region. In some cases, corruption 
alone can explain a large proportion of the variation in infrastructure (e.g. Column 1 
of Panel C). Thus the results of this region level analysis support those of the country 
level analysis above. 
 
There are no variables that can serve as instruments in the region level data - certainly 
none that are fully satisfactory. This is unfortunate as the same arguments for 
endogeneity made at the country level can be made at the regional level. The fact that 
the IV results at the country level were in line with the OLS results does not  
Table 5: Region Level Results II: Sample Splits 
Panel A: Transport Infrastructure 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Africa Europe & Central Asia 
Americas & 
Caribbean 
Rest of the World 
 Constant 0.182*** 0.060 0.152*** -0.109 0.169*** -0.027 0.134*** -0.117 
 
(0.032) (0.454) (0.034) (0.173) (0.037) (0.195) (0.025) (0.288) 
         Enterprise Surveys 
Corruption 0.341*** 0.339*** 0.166* 0.221*** 0.101 0.147** 0.129* 0.117 
Measure (0.097) (0.104) (0.091) (0.077) (0.069) (0.057) (0.077) (0.083) 
         Natural Log of 
Average Total Cost 
 
0.003 
 
0.010 
 
0.029*** 
 
0.009 
of Labour 
 
(0.016) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.009) 
 
(0.020) 
         Average % of Sales 
That Are National 
 
0.001 
 
0.001 
 
-0.002 
 
0.002 
  
(0.004) 
 
(0.001) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.001) 
         R2 0.16 0.16 0.04 0.09 0.03 0.12 0.05 0.06 
N 118 118 158 157 114 114 48 48 
         Panel B: Electricity Infrastructure 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Africa Europe & Central Asia 
Americas & 
Caribbean 
Rest of the World 
 Constant 0.506*** 0.485 0.189*** 0.172 0.253*** 0.362* 0.113*** 0.808* 
 
(0.043) (0.480) (0.038) (0.299) (0.053) (0.200) (0.037) (0.429) 
         Enterprise Surveys 
Corruption 0.104 0.174 0.498*** 0.558*** 0.267*** 0.303*** 0.845*** 0.823*** 
Measure (0.109) (0.127) (0.098) (0.084) (0.101) (0.095) (0.095) (0.098) 
         Natural Log of 
Average Total Cost 
 
-0.040** 
 
0.004 
 
0.013 
 
-0.053** 
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of Labour 
 
(0.018) 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.015) 
 
(0.022) 
         Average % of Sales 
That Are National 
 
0.005 
 
-0.001 
 
-0.003 
 
-0.001 
  
(0.004) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.003) 
         R2 0.01 0.10 0.19 0.24 0.10 0.13 0.57 0.63 
N 118 118 158 157 114 114 48 48 
         Panel C: Telecommunications Infrastructure 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 Africa Europe & Central Asia 
Americas & 
Caribbean 
Rest of the World 
 Constant 0.033 1.203** 0.130*** 0.047 0.140*** -0.791*** 0.039 0.684 
 
(0.023) (0.522) (0.037) (0.251) (0.043) (0.277) (0.027) (0.554) 
         Enterprise Surveys 
Corruption 0.437*** 0.399*** 0.350*** 0.384*** 0.248*** 0.282*** 0.326** 0.392** 
Measure (0.088) (0.081) (0.110) (0.102) (0.086) (0.071) (0.137) (0.151) 
         Natural Log of 
Average Total Cost 
 
0.001 
 
0.022* 
 
0.060*** 
 
-0.011 
of Labour 
 
(0.014) 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.013) 
 
(0.024) 
         Average % of Sales 
That Are National 
 
-0.012*** 
 
-0.002 
 
0.001 
 
-0.006 
  
(0.004) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.002) 
 
(0.004) 
         R2 0.32 0.44 0.12 0.17 0.07 0.23 0.22 0.28 
N 97 97 155 155 112 112 38 38 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and ***   indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. 
necessarily mean that the same would be true at the regional level. Two somewhat 
convincing instruments are firms’ perceptions of how much of a constraint the courts 
system and customs and regulation procedures are to their operations. These 
instruments have acceptable first stage F statistics and give results in line with the 
OLS results presented in Table 4 and are available on request. The issue with these 
exercises is that it is hard to argue that whatever factors may determine both 
corruption and infrastructure do not also determine these instruments. 
 
The region level data allows one to look at within country variation. We have seen 
that there is considerable variation in both infrastructure and corruption within 
countries. An obvious next step is to see if the within country variation in 
infrastructure could be explained by the within country variation in corruption. Some 
decisions regarding infrastructure, be they decisions regarding the initial provision of 
infrastructure or the maintenance of existing stocks, are likely to be made at a regional 
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level. In the first column of Table 6, it can be seen that regions with more corruption 
than the national average tend to have a lower level of infrastructure in general, while 
the second and third columns show that regions with more corruption than the 
national average also tend to have worse infrastructure than the national average. The 
remaining columns show that this is not the case in all of our sub-sample and 
infrastructure pairs. 
 
5 Conclusions 
The results of this paper demonstrate the link between corruption and infrastructure. 
This link is robust to changes in the measures of both corruption and infrastructure. 
Another contribution was some evidence that the relationship is one in which 
corruption determines infrastructure. We also saw that this relationship can vary in 
both significance and magnitude depending on the type of infrastructure and the part 
of the world under consideration. Extending the analysis to the regional level, it was 
shown that the relationship between corruption and infrastructure is also evident. As 
was the case with the country level analysis, the results vary by pairs defined by 
global region and type of infrastructure. It was also shown that within country 
variation matters. Regions with more corruption than their national average tend to 
have worse infrastructure in general and relative to the national average.  
 
A caveat to this is that some firms (and some regions) may complain more about 
things than others. As the Enterprise Surveys continue, it may be become possible to 
create a panel data set that would allow one to address this issue. It would also allow 
one to examine some interesting temporal effects such as the effect of lagged 
corruption on current infrastructure.  Another very appealing line of inquiry would be 
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to examine spatial relationships between corruption and infrastructure both within and 
across countries. 
 
The implications of the results of this paper for policy can only reach the level of 
generalisation but may be informative for policy makers, in particular for those 
formulating policy in a development context. A policy that sought development via 
investment in infrastructure should take note of the setting and type of infrastructure. 
Further, given the large magnitude of the association and the IV evidence that the 
relationship runs from corruption to infrastructure, curbing corruption may be a route 
worth considering if policy makers wish to push for such development. 
 
Table 6: Region Level Results III: Within Country Variation 
Panel A: Transport Infrastructure 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
Full Sample AFR ECA LAC RoW 
Constant -0.042 -0.134 0.000 -0.252 -0.302* -0.074 -0.067 
 
(0.124) (0.104) (0.063) (0.372) (0.167) (0.108) (0.193) 
        Enterprise Surveys Corruption 0.278*** 0.271*** 0.214** 0.098 0.362*** 0.186* 0.469** 
Measure Minus National Average (0.083) (0.061) (0.093) (0.135) (0.087) (0.106) (0.198) 
        Natural Log of Average Total Cost 0.003 0.007 
 
0.007 0.016* 0.012 0.007 
of Labour (0.006) (0.004) 
 
(0.012) (0.008) (0.008) (0.013) 
        Average % of Sales That Are National 0.003*** 0.000 
 
0.002 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
 
(0.003) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Country Fixed Effects NO NO YES NO NO NO NO 
Dependent Variable in Deviation from 
National Average 
NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R2 0.06 0.09 0.05 0.02 0.20 0.10 0.31 
N 437 437 438 118 157 114 48 
Panel B: Electricity Infrastructure 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
Full Sample AFR ECA LAC RoW 
Constant 0.527*** -0.019 -0.000 -0.229 -0.212 0.184 0.119 
 
(0.201) (0.099) (0.096) (0.314) (0.179) (0.145) (0.223) 
        Enterprise Surveys Corruption 0.284*** 0.264*** -0.228** -0.026 0.145 0.697*** 0.602*** 
Measure Minus National Average (0.107) (0.074) (0.090) (0.112) (0.120) (0.124) (0.166) 
        Natural Log of Average Total Cost -0.032*** 0.004 
 
0.004 0.016** -0.002 -0.006 
of Labour  (0.008) (0.005) 
 
(0.010) (0.008) (0.009) (0.014) 
        Average % of Sales That Are National 0.003* -0.000 
 
0.002 0.000 -0.002 -0.001 
 
(0.002) (0.001) 
 
(0.003) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Country Fixed Effects NO NO YES NO NO NO NO 
Dependent Variable in Deviation from NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
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National Average 
R2 0.10 0.07 0.05 0.01 0.06 0.39 0.30 
N 437 437 438 118 157 114 48 
Panel C: Telecommunications Infrastructure 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
 
Full Sample AFR ECA LAC RoW 
Constant -0.092 -0.092 -0.000 0.155 -0.118 -0.065 0.484 
 
(0.186) (0.128) (0.046) (0.276) (0.206) (0.162) (0.450) 
        Enterprise Surveys Corruption 0.288*** 0.288*** 0.295*** 0.034 0.345*** 0.362*** 0.467** 
Measure Minus National Average (0.091) (0.067) (0.076) (0.090) (0.125) (0.098) (0.214) 
        Natural Log of Average Total Cost 0.032*** 0.005 
 
-0.002 0.018* 0.016** -0.007 
of Labour (0.006) (0.004) 
 
(0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.019) 
        Average % of Sales That Are National -0.001 -0.002 
 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.004 
 
(0.002) (0.001) 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) 
Country Fixed Effects NO NO YES NO NO NO NO 
Dependent Variable in Deviation from 
National Average 
NO YES YES YES YES YES YES 
R2 0.12 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.12 0.17 0.23 
N 402 402 402 97 155 112 38 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
 
Table A1: Data Description 
Name Additional Information Mean (SD) Source 
 
Country Level 
  
Enterprise Surveys Corruption 
Measure 
Percentage of firms identifying corruption as a major constraint 
33.65 
World Bank 
Enterprise 
Surveys 
(19.69) 
 
 
 
Transport Infrastructure 
Percentage of firms identifying transportation as a major 
constraint 
17.27 
(12.79) 
 
 
 
Electricity Infrastructure Percentage of firms identifying electricity as a major constraint 
30.62 
(22.95) 
 
 
 
Corruption Perceptions Index Takes values between 0 (more corrupt) and 10 (less corrupt) 
3.41 Transparency 
International 
(1.35) 
 
 
 
 
Control of Corruption Index Takes values between -2.5 (more corrupt) and 2.5 (less corrupt) 
-0.31 
World 
Development 
Indicators 
(0.71) 
 
 
 
Rule of Law Index 
Takes values between -2.5 (worse rule of law) and 2.5 (better 
rule of law) 
-0.32 
(0.74) 
 
 
 
Natural Log of GDP Per Capita Constant 2000 US$ 
7.39 
(1.22) 
 
 
 
Natural Log of Land Area in 
Square Kilometres 
Total land area does not include inland water bodies such as 
major rivers and lakes 
11.80 
 (2.00) 
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Distance From the Equator Latitude in Absolute Degrees Divided by 90 
0.32 
Parker (1997) 
(0.19) 
  
 
 
 
Regional Level 
 
 
Enterprise Surveys Corruption 
Measure 
Percentage of firms identifying corruption as a major constraint 
38.29 
World Bank 
Enterprise 
Surveys 
(22.18) 
 
 
 
Transport Infrastructure 
Percentage of firms identifying transportation as a major 
constraint 
23.19 
(16.34) 
 
 
 
Electricity Infrastructure Percentage of firms identifying electricity as a major constraint 
42.04 
(23.56) 
 
 
 
Telecommunications 
Infrastructure 
Percentage of firms identifying telecommunications as a major 
constraint 
22.54 
(18.42) 
  
 
Natural Log of Average Total Cost 
of Labour 
Survey Questions 
12.59 
(1.60) 
  
Average % of Sales That Are 
National 
90.74 
(8.10) 
Notes: 
1 The statistics quoted are taken from the most recent data available for each country 
which is not necessarily the same year for each country. 
2 See http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/Methodology for the full methodology. 
3 The absolute value of the raw correlation between RL and CC in the sample is 0.87 
whereas it is 0.40 between RL and the ES corruption measure. 
4 This quote suggests that the settler mortality instrument of Acemoglu, Johnson and 
Robinson (2001) would perhaps make a good instrument. However, this would lead to 
a greatly reduced sample that was restricted to countries that had been colonised. 
Therefore it is not an avenue that I pursue here. 
5 When I use the ethnic fractionalisation measure of Alesina, Devleeschauwer, 
Easterly, Kurlat and Wacziarg (2003) as an additional instrument both the first stage F 
statistics and tests of over-identifying restrictions are satisfactory. The results from 
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this exercise lead to identical conclusions as those presented here and are available on 
request. 
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